Foreign
Policy Making in the US
Roger
PERSICHINO
December
6, 2012
Comparison of USAdministration’s response to North Korea after May 2009 with the
Administration’s initial foreign policy plan
Dongwook
LEE
100040097
Usage of
nuclear tests for North Korea is a signal where it wants to make neighbor
countries and political counterparts reassess their prevailing strategies. The
North was insisting that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula would
require the United States to disengage from its security commitments in
Northeast Asia, remove its nuclear umbrella from South Korea, withdraw US
military forces from the peninsula, and develop a US-DPRK strategic
relationship paralleling the US-ROK alliance. This
paper tries to find out the difference between foreign policy to North Korea
proposed by President Obama for his election campaign and what Bush was holding
on till the end of his term, and the difference occurred after North Korea
nuclear test. What is the most notable factor that formed Obama
Administration’s foreign policy measures in response to the North Korea nuclear
test? Which factor had the most influence just after two military provocations?
The United Stateswas pursuing three primary
denuclearization objectives: to convince Pyongyang to relinquish its
fissile-material inventory; to preclude the possibility of additional
fissile-material production by the North; and to ensure the DPRK’s full
compliance with its non-proliferation commitments.
According to US think tanks and policy analysts, the United States has four
options in dealing with a nuclear North Korea:
1.
Give economic aid and a security assurance if
North Korea dismantles its nuclear program.
2.
Use a military strike against North Korean
nuclear facilities.
3.
Let North Korea develop nuclear weapons.
4.
Starve the North Korean regime of money.
The ultimate goal remains nuclear abandonment by
the North, but a more practicable objective is risk minimalisation, both in
relation to the DPRK’s extant weapons and in any potential transfer of
technology and materials beyond North Korea’s borders.
The United States has not yet deemed North Korean nuclear weapons a direct
threat to US national security.
But its nuclear and missile programs remain a prospective threat against which
the US continues to prepare, notably with respect to ballistic-missile defense.
Unlike Israel, India and Pakistan, the DPRK was a signatory to the NPT, the
main cause of reproach from the United States. American officials had additional dealings with
diplomats and technical personnel during the negotiations over Pyongyang’s
missile development, the cancelled light-water reactor (LWR) project, and the
now-suspended disablement of the DPRK’s nuclear complex at Yongbyon. Intelligence
data on the North’s earliest years of nuclear development was patchy and
inconclusive, and more definitive evidence emerged only as the North pursued
development of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, and when IAEA personnel were
briefly able to undertake limited inspections at Yongbyon, the centre of the North’s
plutonium-based program.
If the Congress were divided in two contrasting opinions, there would be no
ability from the US to negotiate the nuclear crisis effectively with the DPRK. Sanctions
managed by the Congress moved to practice after ironing out differences between
Republican senators and representatives. Bipartisanship did not exist even
though organized fact-finding trip to North Korea was conducted with senators
from both parties. However, as more economic aid and stance similar to the
Sunshine Policy from the South Korean government were not a feasible track the
Democratic party can take, Congress worked in a same direction as the UN
Security Council, and mainly operated by Republican party in terms of relations
with North Korea. North Korea Accountability Act of 2009 was introduced by four
senators from the Republican party from Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
in August after the nuclear test, making president Obama along with Secretary
of State and Secretary of the Treasury to pressure North Korea in a state
approach, although it failed to pass the Senate.
The United States approaches to the North Korea’s nuclear issue through
sanctions from the UN Security Council in response based on liberal idealism.
Interventions sanctioned by an international system, notably UNSC and IAEA,
dominated the abnormal relations between the two states so far covering both
Bush and Obama administration. These began three days after the outbreak of the
Korean War, and have been increased in its scope and subject for containment of
North Korean regime.
President
George H. W. Bush on 27 September 1991 announced that the United Sates would
unilaterally withdraw all remaining US tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean
peninsula and from US surface ships in the western Pacific. IAEA
safeguards that the North Korea acceded were due to preliminary South Korean
withdrawal of nuclear weapons. The United States has pushed towards North Korea
giving South Korean case as a justification of stopping nuclear weapons
development, until the George W. Bush administration. With the capabilities it
already had or was soon to complete by the early 1990s, Pyongyang today could
have an arsenal of a hundred or more nuclear weapons.
Some policy analysts believe that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear
weapons reflects anxieties triggered by the end of the Cold War and the DPRK’s
loss of explicit security guarantees from Russia and China.
Pyongyang selected the gas-graphite reactor technology, which was the best
dual-use option for both civilian and military nuclear usage. As a
small nation which uses a strategy of a scorpion to make other two or more
neighboring countries fight each other, a certain amount of exaggeration of
nuclear abilities led to overcome political crises inside North Korea and
strengthened its relation to international community. Although DPRK is called
as a hermit state, its arms deal with countries normally hostile to the United
States remains stable with appreciation of trade partner countries.
A US military
withdrawal from the ROK had long been among Kim Il-sung’s foremost strategic
objectives. As he remarked to Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu only a month
before the Kissinger visit, ‘[I]n the absence of the Americans in South Korea
or of any other foreign forces, the South Korean people could install a
democratic progressive government, through its own forces, and the
establishment of such a government would draw us very close to each other, so
that, without fighting, we could unify the country.’
Under the George W. Bush administration, North Korea and
its leader were the target of contempt, dismissal and verbal attacks. The
politics of “naming, labeling and framing” set the two governments
significantly back in any pre-existing bilateral progress.
Also, the Bush administration killed the Agreed Framework for domestic
political reasons and because it suspected Pyongyang of cheating by covertly
pursuing uranium enrichment.
November 2000
election led to a dismissive tone of Agreed Framework initiated in 1994,
leading to its complete breakdown in 2003. Hardened attitude of the Bush
administration following the attacks of September 11, 2001 was apparent in the
president’s highly personalized criticisms of Kim Jong-il, his characterization
of North Korea as a member of the ‘axis of evil’. After Pyongyang decided to
formally renege on its NPT commitments and restart its long-suspended plutonium
enrichment program, the Bush administration made China as a mediator taking an
offensive role to dissuade North Korea. This tradition goes back to 2002, when
Then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell pressed China to host three-way
discussions because it was clear that Bush was opposed to direct talks,
according to the book “Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell,” by Washington Post
Associate Editor Karen DeYoung.
On bilateralism
of the United States towards North Korea before its first nuclear test in 2006,
president Bush maintained a multilateral approach such as Six-Party Talks in
terms of getting information about North Korea’s nuclear enrichment program. In
a CNN article on October 10, 2006, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on
Tuesday defended the Bush administration’s refusal to hold bilateral talks with
North Korea in the face of Pyongyang’s claim of a successful nuclear test. As
scholars argue that Northeast Asia is a region that has every possibility of
becoming the best trading bloc in the future, because of Japanese capital and
technology, Chinese labor and money, Russian natural resources, and the Korean work
ethic, Bush
administration maintained multilateral approach leveraging gains of regional
cooperation even though his personality and thinking were the most hostile to
North Korean dictatorial regime.
Before the Obama administration, president Bush tried not to provoke
North Korea directly through diplomatic clash. Instead, the United States
managed to leave a very ineffectual diplomatic channel with stubborn policy
principles. The stalled multilateral negotiation has turned out to be a failure
where each member brings its own issues to the community agenda.
Senior Vice Foreign Minister Kang, who acted as the lead North Korean
negotiator for the Agreed Framework, claimed that Pyongyang sought a bilateral
agreement with both countries sitting ‘knee to knee’, but it is very doubtful
that the DPRK anticipated or desired serious negotiations with the Bush
administration.
DPRK’s nuclear
test secured the bilateral channel with the United States, which DPRK failed to
erect during Bush’s first term. After DPRK resumed energy assistance from the
US with bilateral talks, under the terms of the denuclearization action plan of
February 2007 announced at the Six-Party Talks, the North agreed to ‘shut down
and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility’
and to allow IAEA personnel to monitor and verify Pyongyang’s compliance with
its commitments.
But because of small anticipation for the United States to change their
interests, agreement of North Korea turned out to be a makeshift.
During the
visit of US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to Pyongyang in October
2002, the US for the first time accused the DPRK of pursuing uranium
enrichment.
But at a later time, the status goes to zero again. Following the initial 2002
altercation with the Bush administration over North Korea’s alleged uranium
enrichment program, as part of its response to UN sanctions following the April
2009 missile launch, Pyongyang announced that it would now pursue enriching
uranium for domestic LWR program. On
10 January 2003, the DPRK announced its ‘automatic and immediate’ withdrawal
from the NPT and its ‘complete free[dom]’ from the restrictions of the
safeguards agreement within the IAEA, simultaneously claiming that ‘in the
current stage, our nuclear activities will be limited to only peaceful
purposes, including electricity production.’ When
investigating the reason of opting out of NPT for North Korea, it is most
plausible that it wants to be equal to the US in terms of relations in
Northeast Asia.
After a
year-long absence from the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang returned to the
negotiations, culminating with release of the joint statement of 19 September
2005, with Beijing the principal drafter of the document.
However, after that Washington and Pyongyang quickly released unilateral
statements with starkly different interpretations of their respective
obligations.
During 2007 and 2008, North Korea curtailed some of its nuclear activities,
including the shuttering and subsequent disablement of the Yongbyon reactor.
Bilateral negotiations turned out to be a deceit from one side where solutions
to correct the fact lead to another deceit. President Bush’s first term was
plagued with strategic and diplomatic errors that gave North Korea a free hand
to accelerate the development of its nuclear program.
Since Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun, the two former
presidents of South Korea supportive for North Korea in humanitarian and
economic aids did not take North Korean nuclear development in account in terms
of military strategy, the Bush Administration did not have to calculate South
Korean government’s behavior in order to change the originally set policy
orientation towards North Korea. However, antipathy between the two Koreas
started to affect late Bush administration and Obama administration thereafter
till present. Rather than Obama’s election, election of South Korean president
Lee Myung-Bak and his policy change to take the same approach according to the
original policy orientation that prevailed from the beginning of Bush
Administration was the reason for growing tension between the two Koreas and
the leading military provocation in Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Do. However, North
Korean nuclear test in May 2009 also does not bear its relation to president
Obama’s election in late 2008.
Unlike the case
of South Korea in which personality of a president forced another country’s
foreign policy to change, United States had a set of foreign policy towards
North Korea consistently regardless of a new president’s personality. George W.
Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney used the term ‘axis of evil’ for North
Korea, but Bill Clinton and Barack Obama refrained from using that term. Nevertheless,
that does not alter the US vital interests towards North Korea, and only
approaches between the two camps were different. In a closer look of this
procedure, administrative branch has more peculiarities because congressional
support for traditional US foreign policy towards North Korea remained
consistent with the UN Security Council.
Pyongyang had
high expectations for Obama, and expected him to be different from George W.
Bush. The election of a dialogue-oriented president tends not to add UN
Security Council sanctions or resolutions towards North Korea so that it deems
the new president favorable, but as North Korea does not change its foreign
policy directive, so that of the United States cannot change either. With
President Obama’s criticism of Pyongyang’s missile (or satellite) launch in his
Prague speech on April 5, 2009, North Korea responded with a second nuclear
test the following month, on May 25, 2009. When the first nuclear test in October 2006 was
partially successful with a yield of slightly below 1 kiloton, the second was
more successful with an estimated yield of 2 to 4 kilotons. A realist
standpoint considering the United States as a whole, or as a state while
looking through changes in North Korean state can give accurate analysis to
find out the most notable factor for change in foreign policy towards North
Korea from Obama Administration.
At the
beginning of the Obama administration, it asserted that its fundamental policy
objective with the DPRK is ‘a definite and comprehensive resolution’ of the
nuclear issue,
exactly the same as that of Bush administration holding firm of vital American
interests. At that time resuming Six-Party Talks was always at hand, even
though North Korean hostility to Lee Myung-Bak and reticence of Hu Jintao to
initiate softer policy of South Korea were already two main obstacles. This
solution of multilateralism almost vanished throughout North Korea’s efforts to
save its current regime through a significant nuclear test and two military
provocations. Six-Party Talks stopped abruptly just after the nuclear test, and
did not start again since then.
In early 2009,
North Korea forcefully expanded its claims to standing as a nuclear-weapons
state. In
abrupt, unequivocal fashion, the DPRK walked away from every denuclearization
commitment made during the latter years of the Bush administration.
Along with a nuclear test with upgraded warhead compared to 2006, it
simultaneously reactivated the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, which stopped
operating the year before. Every major nuclear test has changed the foreign
policy direction of US, and at that time the change was radical.
The April 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review implies
to expect the emergence of leaders in North Korea who did not see the system’s
fundamental identity tied to retention of nuclear weapons. But in current
situation of failing the yearly goal of economic growth, the current leader has
to remain the status quo in terms of nuclear policy in order not to fail
additionally in political terms. Current leadership of North Korea is called a
‘no landing’ scenario – that is, the perpetuation of the existing system based
on the unquestioned power and authority of the Kim family and of the ruling
elites that support it, retention of its nuclear weapons capabilities, and a
measure of economic recovery.
The United States also keeps a policy of waiting till North Korea forgoes
possession of nuclear weapons and the means to produce additional fissile
material in exchange for US security and economic commitments, a view that
never corresponds with response from North Korea.
But North Korea seeks legitimation by the United
States, and demands affirmation and acceptance of the United States. That is
decreased military alliance with South Korea and Japan, and accepting North
Korea as a nuclear-weapons state such as Israel. At the first time Obama was
elected as president, Arab states and North Korea had a neutral or welcoming
stance compared to a well-expected antagonism towards John McCain. Also for
this year’s election results for giving Obama a second term, Chosun Sinbo, a
pro-DPRK journal in Tokyo also reported the results as ‘neither side won, but
it is true that Romney’s hard line deserves to be reprimanded.’
There have been repeated
oscillations in inter-Korean relations, sometimes including clashes between the
two militaries, of which North Korea’s March 2010 sinking of the ROK Navy
corvette Cheonan was the most lethal of these episodes. Pyongyang’s
November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Do (a ROK-controlled coastal island) constituted the
first use of North Korean artillery against South Korean territory since the
Korean War.
The main reason of the Cheonan attack was interpreted as to reestablish
support for Kim Jong-Il’s rule especially by the military after November 2009
clash on NLL. However, current stalemate does not give any measures in either
military retaliation or bilateral talks. The Yeonpyeong Do attack is
interpreted as a result of explicit revelation conducted by a former director
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker in terms of recently
constructed centrifuges used for uranium enrichment, during his trip to North
Korea in mid-November. After the politically neutral discovery, the blatant
fact of recent violation of UN sanction with pursuit of another route for
nuclear weapons led to doubtful and hostile discussion conducted by US and
South Korean officials, which led to public address and media exposure. After Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Do military provocation,
the Obama administration condemned its behavior along with the address of G8
group of industrialised nations meeting in Toronto in 2010. According to an
agreement made between Lee and Obama in Seoul in November 2009, and a 25-minute
talk over the phone on simultaneous reactions of US and South Korea, Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton along with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates held the
first-ever two plus two security talks with their South Korean counterparts.
Moreover, the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and the Japanese equivalent will
be [is] legally bound to shed light on this incident twenty five years from now
[2010].
With economic sanctions along with
UNSC resolution to reaffirm its denuclearization commitments, US wanted to hear
North Korea’s response opening a channel of dialogue as former president
Clinton’s visit to Pyongyang in August 2009 shows. However, president Obama
himself never succeeded a direct bilateral talk with the North Korean leader
Kim Chong-Un yet. With the singular exception of China, various neighboring
countries and the United States were engaged in deliberations and consultations
about North Korea, not negotiations with North Korea.
As China-DPRK bilateral relations remain strong that no other country can
follow that level of deeper interaction, United States relatively lag behind of
its diplomatic ability. A new leader Kim Chong-Un trying to strengthen his
inner political circle with holding firmly a nuclear card cannot risk his
political path by abruptly opening talks with a US counterpart. After the
leadership change in North Korea, neither secretary-level talks nor summit
talks are currently available. Rather, president Obama visited US military
camps in South Korea and made a public address condemning North Korea’s
behavior with no much change in stance. Holding back of food aid and other
economic support are the only measures designed for stability and anti-nuclear
proliferation at best.
Bushadministration preferred multilateral approach
using Six-Party Talks, but also went on a bilateral discussion table when North
Korea made a provocative action so that appeasement was needed afterwards.
President Bush and members of the National Security Council during his two
terms preferred justified denuclearization of North Korea with consensus of other
neighboring countries. But in Obama administration, even that attempt did not
take place. Obama administration did not change much from its previous
administration, but it became more reticent while seeking consequences if the
North Korea abolishes nuclear weapons and thus fall. What
made a significant difference was the nuclear test in May 2009, and military
provocation of Cheonan and Yeonpyeong do are subsequent results with no major
change from May 2009. As no significant nuclear-generated power supply
for improving people’s lives in North Korea is being conducted, the dual
purpose that North Korea suggests is already an excuse. The answer to
denuclearization does not lie in increasing threat towards North Korea, in
which it will accelerate its drive for nuclear weapons development as a result.
When North Korea believes that fundamental relationship with the United States
was improving, then it is willing to slow down. In an interview with the news
media in 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated “we should try to
step back and see North Korean issues as the forest instead of the trees.”
Looking at a forest, US can consider approaches other than direct sanction to
limit nuclear proliferation, as improved transportation network replacing old
North Korean infrastructure is constructed with support by government-corporate
cooperation, named North Korean Development Bank, is being suggested by think
tanks in the US. If Obama administration wants to make a diplomatic move,
getting out of current stalemate, choosing alternatives other than war while
differentiating from Bush era is going to be another Sunshine Policy or is very
difficult to achieve.